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Abstract 
By using the Bayesian Approach to address the problem of model uncertainty and a binary logit regression, this 
paper examines the credit accessibility of ethnic minority households compared to Kinh households in one of the 
poorest regions of Vietnam–the Northern Mountainous Region. Analyses show that minorities have more 
disadvantages compared to the Kinh majority in terms of household endowments. Ethnic minorities are still 
much more limited to accessing overall rural credit, commercial credit and informal credit compared to the Kinh 
majority population. Although ethnic minorities are more likely to access preferential credit, they receive a 
smaller amount of loans in comparison to the Kinh households irrespective of loan sources. This study builds on 
previous research that shows that the lack of access to affordable credit can make it very difficult for the ethnic 
minorities to expand agricultural production and their household’s livelihoods. Unless constraints with credit 
access are addressed, ethnic minorities might not benefit from the sustainable development of the country. 
Therefore, an improvement in access to credit and other resources needs more concern by national poverty 
reduction policies targeting ethnic minorities. 
Keywords: Bayesian Model Average (BMA), credit access, ethnic minorities, northern mountainous region of 
Vietnam, rural households 
1. Introduction 
Sustainable growth of the country cannot be achieved without investing in all people across countries, regions 
and national communities (World Bank, 2009). The cultural communities of Vietnam are diverse, officially 
comprising 54 ethnic groups. In 2011, Vietnam’s population was around 87.84 million people of which ethnic 
minorities accounted for about 14.5 percent (GSO, 2011). The rest of 85.5 percent were Kinh majority 
populations. 75% of Vietnam’s minorities live in two regions including the Northern Mountains and the Central 
Highlands and most of these minorities remain as rural residents. More than half the districts in the Northern 
Mountains have 10 ethnic minority groups or more represented (World Bank, 2009). Vietnam has achieved 
significant success in poverty reduction. Poverty headcount rate (Note 1) has reduced from nearly 60% of the 
population in 1993 to 11.7 % in 2011 (Baulch, 2010). Despite the overall impressive achievements, ethnic 
minorities have experienced lower rates of poverty reduction than the general population (See Figure 1). Ethnic 
minorities accounted for only 14.5 % of the total population, but they make up 50% of the poor. 
In Vietnam, the poverty rate is substantially higher in the Northern Mountains and Central Highlands. In contrast, 
better-off households are concentrated in the Red River Delta and the Southwest Region (World Bank, 2012). 
Although the higher overall rate of poverty is present in the Northern Mountains, Swinkels and Turk (2006) 
revealed that geography alone does not explain why ethnic minorities are poorer than the Kinh. In fact, Kinh 
populations who also live in impoverished regions are not poorer than they are elsewhere. In addition, Kinh 
people in the same region have achieved higher rates of poverty reduction in comparison to their ethnic minority 
neighbors. One of the explanatory reasons could be attributed to their different access to financial resources. 
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density p(θ) represents the uncertainty about θ. The probability of observing the data D given true parameter θ 
is defined by the likelihood p(D|θ). This is also the probability that model is specified. 
BMA needs prior information to impose weights for each model. Mathematically, the probability of obtaining 
θ୫ given model m is specified as pr(θm|Mm), m=1, …, M). In case of absenting priori information, models have 
same weights. Suppose that we are interested in comparing two models M୫ and M୪ with two parameters θm 
and θ1 respectively. Based on Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability that M1 is the correct model is:  
ܲݎሺܯ௠	|ܦሻ ∝ ܲݎሺܯ௠ሻ ∗ Prሺܦ|ܯ௠ሻ                             (1) 
Then the ratio of their posterior probabilities measured by the posterior odds presents the extent to which the data 
support ܯ௠ over	ܯ௟. Mathematically, the ratio can be presented: 
௉௥ሺெ೘	|஽ሻ
௉௥ሺெ೗	|஽ሻ ൌ
୔୰ሺெ೘ሻ
୔୰ሺெ೗ሻ ∙
୔୰ሺ஽|ெ೘ሻ
୔୰ሺ஽|ெ೗ሻ                                  (2) 
The equation can be also written as: 
Posterior odds = Bayes factor × Prior odds                       (3) 
Of which: Prior odds: is often equal to 1 illustrating the absence of a prior preference for either ܯ௠ or	ܯ௟. 
Bayes factor is the ratio of the integrated likelihoods for ܯ௠ against	ܯ௟. 
The Bayes factor represented by the BIC approximation (Bayesian Information Criterion) will be used as criteria 
for selecting appropriate models. BMA selects a set of variables such that BIC value is lowest. 
For linear regression with normal errors, BIC can be written as: 
BIC = nlog(RSSp) + plogn                               (4) 
Where RSSp is residual sum squared, p is the number of independent variables excluding the intercept and n is 
number of observations. 
The approach of Bayesian Model Average is also applied for the logistic regression or probit model. The key idea 
of Bayesian analysis in such models is the use of Gibbs sampling to simulate data of latent variables. Then those 
latent variables are introduced into the problem to obtain better parameters (Albert & Chib, 1993). The purpose 
of Gibbs sampling is to compute posterior distribution of parameters and the approximate the value of latent 
variable. In the maximum likelihood estimation and Bayesian methods, the logit and probit models give very 
similar results (Tektas & Gunay, 2008). The most important advantage of using BMA is that the choice of 
explanatory variables is more appropriate and estimated parameters are more accurate compared to conventional 
approaches. And this is particularly important for interpreting and generalizing results. 
2.2.2 A binary Logit Regression 
After selecting appropriate variables, a binary logit regression is used to analyze the credit accessibility by rural 
households. The dependent (binary) variable receives a value of one for all households with access to credit and 
a value of zero otherwise. A mixture of continuous and categorical variables reflecting the socio-economic 
conditions of households may explain this dependent binary variable. In the binary logit regression model, the 
predicted probabilities for the dependent variable will never be less than (or equal to) zero, or greater than (or 
equal to) one, regardless of the values of the independent variables. The linear logistic model has the form as 
follows: 
݈݋݃݅ݐ	ሺܲሻ ≡ log ቀ ௉ଵି௉ቁ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܺ                             (5) 
For binary response models, the response, Y, of a household can take on one of two possible values, denoted for 
convenience by 0 and 1. 
X is a vector of explanatory variables which captures the household characteristics. X includes both control 
variables and the variable of the most interest. 
P = Pr(Y = 1/ X) is the probability of accessing credit given X. 
α is the intercept parameter and β is the vector of slope parameters. 
Because Y is binary dependent variable, so the application of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method leads to 
some problems. Specifically, the errors are heteroscedastic and are a function of the parameter vector β; the 
predicted values can take values outside the interval of between 0 and 1 (Tektas & Gunay, 2008). Therefore, 
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for the logit model is more appropriate in this case (Bun, 2002). 
In this study, analyses are conducted for four models including the overall rural credit, preferential credit of 
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VBSP, commercial credit of VBARD and the informal credit model. In the first one, all overall credit-users and 
credit non-users are put into analysis. In the other models, only households with access to a particular source of 
credit are added into analysis. The separations of those models separations allow us to examine determinants of 
accessing to different credit sources. 
2.2.3 The Choice of Explanatory Variables 
The selection of explanatory variables is based on the theories, data availability and potential significance for 
policy interventions. Those variables are important to explain credit accessibility by households and to evaluate 
the creditworthiness of households by lenders.  
Theoretically, there could be many variables influencing credit accessibility of rural households. Suppose that 
credit access is a function of possible explanatory variables.  
Credit access = f(ethnic minorities, risk, social capital, age, education, family size, nonfarm income, extension, 
membership of local associations, distance to market, asset, land fragmentation). 
In order to reliably infer the causal relationship between the ethnicity and credit access, other independent 
variables (control variables) are also included in the credit access model. The description and hypotheses of how 
each variable influences credit access are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Description and assumptions of selected explanatory variables  
Variables Type Description Expected sign 
Help Continuous The number of people known who could be asked for help (persons) + 
Relation Binary Households have members, relatives or friends holding office or other trusted 
position in the communes (1=Yes) 
+ 
Risk Binary Household suffered risks over the previous 12 months (1= Yes) - 
Risk losses Continuous Economic losses caused by agricultural and health risks (VND 1000) - 
Age Continuous General education of household heads (years in school) +/- 
Family size Continuous Total members of the household (persons) +/- 
Nonfarm Continuous Share of non-farm income in total household income (%)  
Extension  Binary Households have access to extension services (1=Yes) + 
Visits Continuous Number of household visits to agricultural extension in the last 12 months and vice 
versa (number) 
+ 
Savings Continuous Total value of savings (VND 1000) - 
Union Binary Membership of women’s unions (1=Yes) + 
Asset Continuous Total value of household asset (VND 1000) + 
Plot Continuous The number of land plots household own (number) +/- 
Source: Based on prior expectations. 
 
A brief description and assumptions of control variables and variables of interest are presented as follow: 
2.2.3.1 The Variables of the Most Interest 
Ethnicity is the variable of the most interest. This binary variable captures the difference between the ethnic 
minorities and the Kinh ethnic majority. It receives a value of one for ethnic minority households and is zero 
otherwise. Ethnic minorities include Tay, Nung, Dao, H’Mong and some other ethnic minority groups.  
2.2.3.2 Control Variables 
Social: In this study, two variables are used as proxies for social capital of households. The first continuous one 
(Help) indicates the number of people known who could be asked for help. Burt (2000) indicated that social 
capital refers to friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through which households receive opportunities 
to use other forms of capital. The theory of social capital can be applicable to the rural credit market. Dufhues et 
al. (2011) also argued that social capital of households also explains their credit repayment performance and 
therefore relates to creditworthiness of households. The second one, Relation, which is a binary variable 
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receiving a value of 1 for cases in which households have members, relatives or friends holding office or other 
trusted positions in the communes. It is expected that households with better relationships to local authorities 
might have better access to credit (Behr et al., 2011). 
Risk: This binary variable receives a value of one for households, which suffer from unexpected risks, and 
otherwise zero.  
Risk losses: It is assumed that economic losses caused by agricultural and health risks can push rural households 
into further poverty or indebtedness. Farm households, especially the poor ones are the most vulnerable in 
Vietnam (GSO, 2012b). Therefore, access to financial services such as credit and insurance is very important for 
farmers because of two such services might help farmers to cope with risks and improve their agricultural 
production efficiency (Skees & Barnett, 2006). 
Age: Age of the household head might represent the social reputation and attitude to debt. Moreover, age is 
likely to correlate with income or consumption over time. Income generated by household heads and their family 
increases to a peak as their career develops then declines when they get older (Zeller & Sharma, 2002). 
Education (years in school): A household head with a higher level of education is believed to be a better manager 
regarding farm household decisions, performing better risk management and higher income generation. This 
variable also reveals the social reputation in rural society because societies highly appreciate people who have a 
higher educational level. Moreover, education level also represents the potential to work in off-farm activities. 
From the point of view of lenders, they are likely to believe that more educated households are more 
creditworthy than less educated ones (Khalid, 2003; Okurut, 2006). 
Family size: This variable can represent the labor potential of the farm household as well as the dependency ratio. 
On the one hand, a larger household size might indicate a greater number of laborers, which is a potential for the 
household’s future income and repayment ability. On the other hand, a larger household size might increase the 
dependency ratio (measured by taking the number of people outside the working age range divided by the 
number of people aged within the range (16-60 years). Consequently, households with a higher number of 
dependents are considered to be less able to improve their living standard and hence, less creditworthy (Bao, 
Duong, & Izumida, 2002).  
Nonfarm: The share of non-farm activities in total yearly income refers to that portion of farm household income 
obtained off the farm, including nonfarm wages and salaries, pensions, and interest income earned by farm 
families. Stampini and Davis (2009) concluded that households engaging in off-farm labor activities spend 
significantly more on seeds, services, hired labor and livestock inputs. Encouraging access to off-farm activities 
may serve as a substitute for access to credit. 
Extension: This variable reflects the access and the numbers of household visits to the agricultural extension 
stations in the last 12 months and vice versa. Agricultural extension services are assumed to help farmers manage 
and use resources more effectively. At the same time, maintaining relationships with agricultural extension 
stations might improve the household’s social capital to improve access to other services such as credit (Mahajan 
& Vasumathi, 2010).  
Savings: This variable reflects the total value of savings, which might represent collateral security and household 
ownership as physical capital. In addition, it is a good indicator of the repayment capability of a household. 
Savings are essential for the extremely poor who strongly rely on their own savings and depend on informal 
credit to prevent food shortages and starvation (Wright et al., 1997). 
Union: Membership of women’s unions might improve household social networks. Women’s participation in 
credit programs is helpful into improving women’s empowerment, women’s mobility and their social 
interactions at the community level (Pitt et al., 2006). Hence, these households may better access credit 
programs. 
Distance: The distance of the household to the commune center is used to capture the transaction costs to obtain 
credits as well as the market access conditions of households. It is expected that a greater distance increases 
transaction costs in accessing credit and the market. In return, higher transaction costs are expected to have a 
negative impact on loan repayment. (Khoi et al., 2013) and Stanton (2002) argued that infrastructure has a link to 
transaction costs of obtaining loans. In this aspect, better infrastructure could enhance profitable business 
activities that cover loan costs.  
Asset: This variable reveals the total value of household assets, which might represent the relative wealth level 
of households. Access to credit is determined by relative wealth status of households rather than collateral 
ownership (Takahashi et al., 2010). 
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Plot: This variable indicates the number of land plots households own. It is assumed that land fragmentation 
might discourage the use of other necessary inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, agricultural extension, irrigation 
services, and so on. Zeller and Sharma (2002) showed that household demand for credit depends on availability 
of agricultural production inputs rather than farm size.  
3. Results 
3.1 Credit Sources Categorized by Ethnicity Groups 
In the Northern Mountainous Region of Vietnam, rural households borrow from two main credit sources namely 
from the formal and informal sectors. The formal sector is composed of the two state-owned banks including 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and 
People’s Credit Funds (PCFs). The informal credit sector comprises all lenders such as private lenders 
(shopkeepers, moneylenders, or any lender without a family relationship or friendship with the borrower) and 
household friends and relatives. Table 2 presents the distribution of selected households in terms of credit access 
and ethnic groups. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of households in terms of credit sources and ethnicity 
Credit sources 
Kinh Ethnic minorities All sample 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Non-accessed 260 65.16 638 67.94 898 67.12 
Accessed 139 34.84 301 32.06 440 32.88 
Only Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) 37 9.27 207 22.04 244 18.24 
Only Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD) 
40 10.03 27 2.88 67 5.01 
Only People’s Credit Funds (PCF) 3 0.75 2 0.21 5 0.37 
Only UNION 9 2.26 7 0.75 16 1.20 
Only informal 42 10.53 50 5.32 92 6.88 
VBSP & informal 7 1.75 5 0.53 12 0.90 
VBARD & VBSP 0 0.00 3 0.32 3 0.22 
VBARD & PCF 1 0.25 0 0.00 1 0.07 
Total 399 100 939 100 1338 100 
Note. UNION represents Farmer’s/Veteran’s/Women’s Union. 
Source: own calculation. 
 
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the biggest state owned commercial bank, 
was established in 1990. It has provided commercial credit for agricultural and rural areas, which account for 
more than 50% of its total outstanding loan volume (GSO, 2012a). The major form of government intervention 
in rural credit markets in Vietnam is the extension preferential loans of Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) 
to low-income agricultural households. Preferential credit can be received via the bank. Borrowers pay only part 
of the commercial interest rate, whereas the remainder is paid by the government. There is hence, a subsidy of 
the interest rate. Since 2003, preferential credit has been handed out by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy. The 
bank has provided 11 programs of lending to low income households. These credit programs comprise loans for 
the poor households, extremely disadvantaged ethnic minority households, programs for business and production 
households living in extremely disadvantaged areas and communes, etc. In the country, after the collapse of rural 
credit cooperatives in the late 1980s, a network of People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) was established. The key 
objective of PCFs is to build the confidence of rural people in the formal credit system, to reform and strengthen 
the country’s rural banking system. PCFs are commune-based entities, jointly owned, operated and managed by 
their members to provide savings and credit services. PCFs are operating based on the economic principle of cost 
covering. However, PCFs have been established in regions with better socio-economic development. The 
targeted customers of PCFs are farms, small and medium enterprises rather than poor farm households. 
Therefore, the network plays a limited role in proving credit to the rural poor and poverty reduction (Putzeys, 
2002).  
Although rural credit has been increased in recent years, there is still a large proportion (nearly 70%) of 
households without credit access. A majority of rural households have access to formal credit sources, while a 
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Nonfarm .13*** .03 .17*** .05 .14*** .03 
Extension .49 .50 .57 .58 .52 .53 
Visits 1.80*** 1.10 1.63 1.51 1.74*** 1.23 
Savings 27789*** 5111 7894* 4135 20858*** 4798 
Union .11*** .03 .11*** .03 .11*** .03 
Asset 19574*** 11522 26719*** 11631 22063*** 11557 
Plot 8.39*** 11.64 9.32*** 11.85 8.71*** 11.71 
Distance 1.47*** 4.96 1.69*** 4.25 1.55*** 4.73 
Note. Absolute value of standard deviation in parentheses; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: own calculation. 
 
3.3 Ethnic Minorities and Credit Accessibility 
Table 4 presents the explanatory variables selected by the approach of Bayesian Model Average (BMA), and the 
Probit regression. LR chi-square statistics are equal to 73.33, 59.29, 56.02 and 27.46 for pooled, VBSP, VBARD 
and informal credit model respectively. These results lead to reject the null hypotheses that all parameters in 
three models are equal to zero. In other words, all models are appropriate at the confidence level of 99%. The 
Probit models predicted 68.16, 80.64, 94.62 and 92.45 % of all households correctly. These results indicate that 
the goodness of fit is satisfied.  
As expected, control variables also influence credit access by rural households. Those variables are important 
because they not only explain the determinants of credit access but serves for adjusting the coefficient of 
Ethnicity variable- the variable of the most interest. The social capital related variable reflected by the number of 
helpers is positively associated with credit accessibility by households. This result agrees with the finding of 
Story and Carpiano (2015), which indicated that a better connection with helpers facilitates household social 
capital and credit access.  
The coefficient of Nonfarm is positive and significant for the overall credit and formal commercial credit model. 
Households with a higher proportion of off-farm income might need better skills to run other business activities. 
In addition, these households might have laborers, who work for governmental organizations or companies, 
which require higher levels of qualification. Non-farm income is also useful for households to smooth 
consumption in the case of crop losses or other unexpected risks. As expected, households with a higher share of 
non-farm income have better access to credit, especially non-preferential credit sources. This finding favors the 
statement of Simtowe et al. (2006), which showed that households with a higher share of nonfarm income are 
more likely to access technologies, be less vulnerable to risks and achieve creditworthiness. 
 
Table 4. Logistic estimation of credit accessibility 
Explanatory variables Overall credit VBSP VBARD Informal 
Intercept -.36 -1.61*** -2.73*** -2.63*** 
Control variables     
Help .04*** .05***  .04** 
Risk .60*** .53***  .76*** 
Age -.02*** -.02***   
Nonfarm .83**  1.93***  
Extension .09***  .17***  
Savings -.0000161*** -.000012** -.0000103*  
Variable of interest     
Ethnicity -.37** .58*** -1.00*** -.97*** 
Number of observations  1338 1338 1338 1338 
LR chi2(7) 73.33 59.29 56.02 27.46 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Correctly classified (%) 68.16 80.64 94.62 92.45 
Note. ** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: own calculation. 
 
www.ccse
Househol
confirmed
not only 
informati
members 
disbursem
report tha
as well as
The coeff
Results in
attributed
result is 
self-insur
Risk has 
coefficien
affected b
land prod
to risks is
In term o
potential 
institution
The varia
Ethnic m
rural cred
with the 
borrower
The fact 
country w
Thailand.
3.4 Ethni
Improvin
Loan pro
concerned
the mean
graph als
 
Source: own
net.org/ijef 
ds with acce
 by the over
improve kn
on about cred
of local mas
ent. This arg
t access to ex
 provide info
icient of Savi
dicate that ho
 by the fact 
in line with 
ance tool and
a positive co
t is particular
y personal ri
uctivity, crop
 to take loans
f Age of ho
for improving
s for a longe
ble of the mo
inority househ
it, especially 
mission of V
s of preferent
that the poore
ith Vietnam
 His paper hig
c Minorities a
g access to lo
viders norma
 very much 
s and standar
o provides the
F
 graph. 
In
ss to agricu
all and forma
owledge, agr
it sources an
s organizatio
ument agrees
tension servi
rmation about
ngs is negativ
useholds wit
that savings a
the finding 
 a financial su
efficient indi
ly significant
sks but also b
 yield and ho
. 
usehold head
 agricultural 
r time.  
st interest is 
olds are mor
commercial c
BSP to provid
ial credit are 
r households
. Coleman (
hlighted the 
nd Credit Am
ans by ethnic
lly restrict th
about the abil
d deviations 
 visualization
igure 4. Distr
ternational Jou
ltural extensi
l commercial
icultural pro
d credit institu
ns such as fa
 with the find
ces is signific
 credit progra
e and signific
h higher amou
re substitutab
of Dong et 
bstitution sou
cating that ri
 for all credit 
y weather co
usehold incom
s, lenders ten
production w
Ethnicity, wh
e likely to acc
redit from V
e credit to th
ethnic minori
 benefit less 
2006) evalua
positive impa
ounts 
minorities als
e maximum 
ity of borrow
of credit amo
 of mean com
ibution of loa
rnal of Econom
175 
on services 
 credit model
duction skill
tions. In add
rmer’s union
ings of Buad
ant to help f
ms to potenti
ant at the 5 %
nts of saving
le for loans 
al. (2012), w
rce for credit
sk affected h
models excep
nditions and
e. Perhaps, o
d to provide
ithin this econ
ich has statist
ess preferent
BARD and in
e poor, espec
ties, who are 
from accessin
ted the impa
ct of accessin
o means incr
amount of l
ers to repay. 
unt in each a
parison in lo
n amounts cat
ics and Finan
are likely to
s. Agricultura
s but also p
ition, those h
s, which ofte
i et al. (2013
amers manage
al borrowers.
 level for all
s are less like
to meet hous
hich reported
.  
ouseholds ar
t the VBARD
 fluctuation o
ne possible w
 loans to you
omic age ran
ically signific
ial credit by V
formal sourc
ially ethnic m
poorer than th
g credit is al
ct of two m
g credit but o
easing their a
oans they are
Figure 4 illus
ccessed hous
an amounts be
egorized by e
ce
 access cred
l extension s
rovide house
ouseholds are
n play an int
) and Okten a
 and use reso
credit models
ly to take loan
ehold deman
 that saving
e more likely
 model. The 
f market pric
ay of poorer
nger clients 
ge and can be
ant coefficien
BSP but less 
es. These resu
inorities. In 
e Kinh majo
so found in T
icrofinance p
nly for non-po
mounts of cre
 willing to g
trated by an e
eholds catego
tween groups
 
thnicity group
Vol. 7, N
it. This con
ervices are ex
holds with 
 more likely 
ermediate ro
nd Osili (200
urces more e
 except infor
s. The reason
ds of investm
s can also s
 to access cr
poor are not 
es. Risks mig
 households t
who might re
 members of
ts in all cred
likely to acce
lts are quite 
realities, a m
rity in the sam
hailand, a ne
rograms in 
or borrowers
dit as much a
rant because
rror bar grap
rized by ethn
. 
s 
o. 6; 2015 
clusion is 
pected to 
necessary 
to also be 
le in loan 
4), which 
ffectively 
mal credit. 
 could be 
ent. This 
erve as a 
edit. This 
only more 
ht reduce 
o respond 
present a 
 the credit 
it models. 
ss overall 
consistent 
ajority of 
e region. 
ighboring 
Northeast 
. 
s possible. 
 they are 
h presents 
icity. The 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 6; 2015 
176 
It is observed that distribution of loan amount is quite different among groups. Minorities significantly obtain 
smaller loans compared to the Kinh for all credit sources (Note 4). This could be explained by the fact that 
preferential loans for minorities come mostly from VBSP, which has a credit limit policy (around 30 million 
VND or less). Smaller amounts of loans might target poorer households. The deeper outreach of preferential 
credit is remarkably due to the policy of subsidized interest rates. In contrast, credit of VBARD is mainly offered 
to the wealthier households who qualify for higher amounts. Loans from VBARD often have higher interest rates 
and need collateral requirements such as land use certificates. In addition, loan amounts tend to vary 
significantly in case of the Kinh accessed households. This could be explained by the fact that the loan amount 
of the Kinh households may be adjusted in the case of VBARD because borrowers and lenders are more flexible 
to negotiate their credit contracts. Smaller loans from preferential credit might be insufficient for ethnic minority 
households to expand production and improve livelihood. This argument is supported by the findings of 
Coleman (1999) and Bauchet and Morduch (2013), which have a common implication that small loans have no 
significant impacts on farm profits. van Rooyen et al. (2012) also showed that small loans have higher 
probability of harming the poorest households in Sub-Saharan Africa and credit intervention by itself seems to 
have no significant impact. 
4. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper has attempted to provide an understanding of the difference in household endowments and credit 
access between ethnic minorities and the Kinh majority in the Northern Mountains of Vietnam. Although the 
government has paid great attention to the development of minorities, a number of disadvantages including 
limited access to extension and credit still remain. Specifically, this study shows that ethnic minorities are less 
likely to access overall rural credit, credit of VBARD and informal credit. Although minorities have better access 
to preferential credit, they still receive smaller amounts of loans compared to the Kinh majority regardless of 
credit sources. The shortage of credit might make it very difficult for ethnic minorities to expand their production 
and diversify their likelihoods. Subsidized loans from the Bank for Social Policy are important, but the credit 
amounts from this source are limited. If the ethnic minorities are still limited in their access to credit while the 
lack of capital is one of the main reasons in explaining their poverty situations, then the economic growth might 
not benefit all people throughout the country. 
Therefore, to improve the credit access by ethnic minorities, a policy with comprehensive socio-economic 
dimensions should be also considered. The average size of formal loans could be raised for ethnic minorities. 
However, the provision of credit to ethnic minorities needs to consider the purposes of credit use, the seasonality 
of farming activities as well as their cash flow of income and expenditure. The development of risk-coping 
capacities such as agricultural insurance and health care insurance could not only help ease the credit access 
constraints but also enhance the welfare impact of credit. Ethnic minorities in the research areas face various 
types of risks, especially from natural conditions. However, farm households have little risk prevention measures 
as none of them are covered by any type of agricultural insurance. In addition, ethnic minorities also need 
non-financial services such as business skills, market access, agricultural extension services and infrastructure 
improvement.  
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Notes 
Note 1. The national poverty line based on Decision 09/2011/QD-TTg of Vietnamese Government for the period 
2011-2015 is VND 400, 000 monthly capita income. 
Note 2. T-statistic is computed to test the difference in average income: t-test= 9.26 and p-value =0.0000; 
Note 3. T-statistics are computed for continuous variables and Peason chi2 is applied for discrete variables to test 
the difference in means of selected variables between ethnic minorities and Kinh majority. 
Note 4. T-statistics are employed to test the differences in means of loan amounts received by ethnic minority 
households and Kinh majority households: t-test= 3.11, 1.99, 2.29 and 3.68 for the overall credit, preferential 
credit of VBSP, commercial credit of VBARD and informal sources respectively. 
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